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Plugging the Leak in § 1498:
Coercing the United States into
Owners
of
Patent
Notifying
Government Use
ABSTRACT

When the United States uses a patent for public,
noncommercial purposes, it is required under the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
to provide notification to the patent owner. However, the United
States has never implemented legislation to conform with its
obligation and is therefore in violation of TRIPS. This Note
argues that by permitting obvious and smaller violations-such
as lack of notification-to fester, the United States has left the
door open for other members of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) to weaken the United States' overall trade policy.
Members could likely accomplish this goal by first bringing a
dispute over obvious U.S. violations to the WTO in order to
build a growing sentiment against the United States. If the
United States wishes to stay ahead of such risks and continue
using current tradepolicies, it should amend its laws to correct
smaller violations such as the lack of notification, and thus
prevent possible attacks from rival members.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"Whenever... a patent of the United States is used ...by or for
the United States without license ... or lawful right to use .... the
[patent] owner's remedy shall be... recovery of his reasonable and
entire compensation . . . ." But is the United States obligated to
disclose the use of the patent? What if the United States were to use a
foreign defense contractor's patent and deny the patent owner the
ability to learn of such use on national security grounds? What would
the international community do in retaliation? This Note argues that
while there is no domestic obligation to disclose government use to a
patent owner, the United States is in violation of the 1994 World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS).2 Accordingly, the United States should

1.
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006). For a detailed overview of § 1498 and the
process of bringing a claim against the United States, see David R. Lipson, We're Not
Under Title 35 Anymore: PatentLitigation Against the United States Under 28 U.S.C. §
1498(a), 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 243 (2003).
2.
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
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amend its domestic law before other countries have the opportunity to
use the violation to weaken U.S. trade policy in key enforcement
areas.
TRIPS is an agreement on international intellectual property
(IP) rights that has strong roots in U.S. history. 3 Similar to U.S. law,
TRIPS takes an aggressive approach to the enforcement of patent
rights both domestically and internationally.4 When a WTO
member's 5 patent laws do not comply with TRIPS, the member risks
litigation through a dispute process. The resolution and final outcome6
of a dispute can include a forced change of law or trade sanctions.
However, the real danger to a violating country is the threat of a
dispute itself. Rival nations can intimidate a violating country into
accepting a range of trade-related agreements that disadvantage the
violator and increase the wealth of the instigator. 7 The United States
has employed this tactic long before TRIPS came into existence and
even helped draft the agreement to ensure a continuing legal way to
8
accomplish its goals.
For the United States, this strategy of strong-arming competitors
is a double-edged sword. The United States has vigorously enforced
its IP rights against violating members through a variety of
questionable tactics. 9 The world has taken notice of the hypocritical
behavior of the United States, as many nations refuse to abide by the
same agreements it forces on others. Indeed, rival countries loathe

Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1995) [hereinafter TRIPS] (establishing WTO members'
obligation to protect intellectual property rights in furtherance of international trade).
3.

See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION

OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 96-120 (2003) (opining that pressure placed on the
U.S. government to take the lead in improving the international protection of
intellectual property by corporations led to the United States' role as a major player in
defining TRIPS).
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 41 ("Members shall ensure that enforcement
4.
procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as to permit
effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered
by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements."). For an especially
detailed analysis of various TRIPS enforcement measures, see generally CARLOS M.
CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2007)
(discussing Article 41 in context of other provisions of TRIPS and defining the scope of
enforcement).
There are currently 153 WTO countries and trading territories that have
5.
different levels of TRIPS implementation based on varying timetables. Understanding
the WTO-Members, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
whatis e/tif-e/org6 e.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
See discussion infra Part III.C.
6.
See discussion infra Part III.C (discussing how the threat of a dispute can
7.
intimidate countries into negotiating a settlement favorable to the challenger).
See generally SELL, supra note 3, at 75-85 (chronicling the development of
8.
a U.S. trade-based approach to IP enforcement).
See infra Part 1V.A (discussing how the United States has used its power to
9.
manipulate nations that are incapable of defending themselves in expensive disputes).

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL, 45.:879

the bargaining power of the United States through trade embargos
and tariffs, the unilateral Special 301 powers of the U.S. Trade
Representative, and the disregard of TRIPS compliance while
demanding implementation from others. 10
The idea of U.S. exceptionalism has reigned on the world stage in
the past century.1 There is only a matter of time though before
competitor nations employ a strategy of using U.S. noncompliance
with TRIPS to gain a trading edge on the world's largest exporter.
Together with a growing global economy, the United States cannot
operate under the assumption that it is immune from the demands of
other nations and is the sole hegemonic nation. If members
collectively act against the United States, the power and position it
has enjoyed will surely decline. However, major complaints against
the United States in the past have proven unwise. Thus, a more
nuanced plan of attack is likely.
This Note argues that the United States must comply with the
agreement it helped to foster and notify patent owners when it uses a
patent. If the United States cannot see the wisdom in complying with
TRIPS then the rest of the world will not only enforce compliance, but
also likely use the obvious violation to attack U.S. policy. After briefly
discussing current U.S. law on government use and analyzing the
relevant international agreements, Part II determines the United
States is in violation of TRIPS. The importance of enforcing the
notification requirement is discussed in Part III, including why
patent holders, especially foreign patentees, have virtually no chance
of discovering use without notification; why developed countries have
a stake in bolstering the enforcement of TRIPS; and why the
international community needs to highlight the legitimacy of Dispute
12
Settlement Understanding (DSU).
In Part IV, the central thesis is developed by examining the
major complaints against the United States-the Special 301 powers
employed by the Trade Representative, threats of TRIPS violations in
exchange for trade concessions, and failing to meet international
standards while requiring compliance. By initially determining a
member similar to the European Union will be the plaintiff in a
dispute against the United States, this Note concludes the first
attempt to alter U.S. trade policy will likely be made through a

10.
Id.
11.
See, e.g., Origins and Future of U.S. "Exceptionalism"(NPR radio broadcast
May 2, 2008), available at http:lwww.npr.orgltemplateslstorylstory.php?storyId
=90126925 (describing how the United States has always been considered "very
different" from other countries).
12.
See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (laying out the general provisions of the
WTO dispute settlement system and explaining its importance).
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relatively smaller contest. While the prudent action would be for the
United States to amend its law regarding notification requirements to
comply with TRIPS, if it refuses, the international community will be
incentivized to force implementation. After all, a ruling against the
United States can be employed in a grander scheme to weaken U.S.
policy. The lack of a notification requirement is small enough to be
solvable by the United States, yet large enough to alter policy in the
defense sector. This would be a deceptive and unfortunate blow to
U.S. interests. It could also force the United States to write a less
favorable amendment to the law with the greater attention from
members.
In Part V, the defensive strategy for the United States is
explored. This begins with an overview of similar statutes and
treaties involving other countries that the United States can use as a
template. To that end, this Note concludes that to stay one move
ahead of competing nations, the best strategy for the United States is
to proactively amend its law. Through adding a notification
requirement without international pressure, the United States can
minimize damage to defense contractors, among others, while
delaying disputes on other issues. However, if the United States
procrastinates and does not amend the law, this Note lays out
possible arguments for its use in an eventual dispute. Finally, Part VI
concludes that for the United States to continue using TRIPS as an
effective means of controlling international IP standards, it needs to
proactively fix compliance violations on its own terms. By rewriting
the law to fix the lack of notification, the United States can define
terms such as how and when a patent owner is notified while
satisfying international obligations.

II. BACKGROUND
This Part begins by introducing § 1498 and its place in U.S. law.
It then introduces the TRIPS Agreement and concludes that while
other countries are likely in compliance, the United States is clearly
in violation of the Agreement.
A. U.S. Law on Government Use of Private Patent
Section 1498 allows the U.S. government to use a patent for
public noncommercial reasons. The relevant version of the statute
reads:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the
United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States
without license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or
manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall be by action against
the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims for the
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recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture....
For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an
invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States by
a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the
Government and with the authorization or consent of the Government,
13
shall be construed as use or manufacture for the United States.

By requiring "reasonable and entire compensation" for the use of the
patent, the United States has acknowledged it cannot take away a
patent holder's right to reparation. 14 This is made possible because
§ 1498 requires the government to waive sovereign immunity when a
contractor has used a patent. 15 The waiver is not based on an
infringement by the U.S. government. Instead, the government is
simply responsible for paying a reasonable royalty under a tort theory
of liability. 16 Therefore, § 1498 encourages patent infringement
because contracting companies know they can reduce bids on
government contracts since they can use patents without fear of
liability. 17
Despite what the statute requires, it neglects to mention how a
patent holder can discover the government use.' 8 A patent owner is
entitled to receive a sum of money from the government, 19 but if the
patent owner has no way to learn of the use he may never be
reimbursed. This problem is only magnified in a national defense
context. The legislative history of the statute shows the government
initially intended for patent holders to be notified of the government
use when the law was passed during World War 1.20 At the very least,

13.
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006).
14.
See Blake Evan Reese, Note, Do as I Say, Not as I Do: An Internationaland
Comparative Study of Governments' Rights to "Infringe"Patents in Light of the Federal
Circuit'sRecent Interpretationof 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and a Call for Congress to Modernize
the Statute, 4 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 84, 117-18 (2006) (finding that the history of
U.S. patent law demands payment to a patent holder to satisfy the historical reasons
for patents in general).
15.
See, e.g., INST. FOR TRADE, STANDARDS & SUSTAINABLE DEV. [ITSSD],
ITSSD COMMENTS CONCERNING DOCUMENT (SCP/13/3): PATENT EXCLUSIONS,
EXCEPTIONS & LIMITATIONS 1.8 (2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/scp/en/
meetings/session_14/studies/itssd_2.pdf [hereinafter ITSSD COMMENTS] (noting that §
1498 permits patent owners to sue the government by waiving sovereign immunity).
16.
Jerome H. Reichman, Presentation to the AALS Mid-Year Workshop on
Intellectual Property: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Inventions: Comparing
United States Law and Practice with Options Under the TRIPS Agreement 5-6 (June
15,
2006)
(citation
omitted),
available at http://www.aals.orgldocuments/
2006intprop/JeromeReichmanOutline.pdf.
17.
Id. at 6.
18.
See generally § 1498(a).
19.
Id.
20.
ITSSD COMMENTS, supra note 15, at 14 (describing how the Navy,
concerned about the potential for litigation, requested an amendment that gave the
government broad authority to use patented technologies for a governmental purpose).
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it was assumed the use would become known through a variety of
21
measures.
Over the course of the past one hundred years, patent holders
have discovered most instances of government use without
notification. 22 This usually derived from the government using a
patent after failed licensing negotiations and the patent owner
proactively looking for government use. 23 However, during that same
time the number of patents available for government use has
increased exponentially. 24 Coupled with the dramatic expansion of
the national defense budget 25 and lack of centralized agency
oversight, the United States has neglected to amend § 1498 to help a
domestic or foreign patent owner discover the government use.
Patent holders clearly deserve compensation, but the U.S.
government has attempted to circumvent those rights by failing to
require notification of use. 26 A proponent of the current statute would
argue that part of the bargain a patentee makes with the government
in exchange for a limited monopoly is the right to use the patent for
public noncommercial purposes. The same advocate would also argue
the purposes are limited to those deemed valuable for the public good
by the government.
However, while the U.S. Constitution allows for Congress to
provide for the common welfare, 27 it also states that patent holders are
28
entitled to "the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries."
Patent rights have never been meant to be subordinated to the

21.
See generally Reese, supra note 14, at 106-15 (demonstrating how other
countries give notice of use).
22.
Although the number of cases brought before the Federal Court of Claims is
likely indicative of the majority of takings by the government, it cannot account for the
unknown number of potential cases that could have arisen if the patent owners had
been told of the use.
23.
See Timothy R. Wyatt, In Search of "Reasonable Compensation" Patent
Infringement by Defense Contractors with the Authorization and Consent of the U.S.
Government, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 79, 85 (2010) (citing Robishaw Eng'g, Inc. v. United
States, 891 F. Supp. 1134 (E.D. Va. 1995)) (discussing how, after failing to secure a
license from a patentee, the U.S. government allowed the patentee's competitor to
make the product for government use).
24.
U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: 1963-2010, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
25.
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 47-62 (2010), available at

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2011-TAB/pdf/BUDGET-2011-TAB.pdf
(charting the general historical tables for defense spending throughout the history of
the United States).
26.
See Reese, supranote 14, at 106-15 (comparing U.S. law to other countries'
statutes and noting that other countries provide for notification while the United
States does not).
27.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To ...provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .....
28.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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government's interest. 29 Indeed, the Supreme Court has declared as,
much in various rulings. 30 Congress though has not taken these signs
to mean the government has an affirmative duty to inform a patent
holder when it confiscates a patent. 31 Instead, the U.S. government has
seemingly granted patent owners only a token concession, as § 1498
allows for recovery for government use while never notifying owners
that they have this right.
B. TRIPS
The TRIPS agreement is a pact between members to provide an
international standard for IP protection. 32 TRIPS does not create an
international patent system. 33 Instead it sets a minimum bar of
protection for patents in member nations. 34 Patent rights, of
particular importance to large corporations in developed countries,
have a broad range of protections aimed at curbing infringement. 35
Last year alone, pharmaceutical, agriculture, and entertainment
corporations generated close to $2 trillion in profit and have an
enormous interest in protecting their technology. 36 Although the
United States is seen as a driving force in creating TRIPS, it is
equally valid to claim that U.S. corporations that pressured Congress
37
were the ultimate instigators.
As an example, the ability of U.S. corporations to enforce patent
rights abroad was severely limited prior to TRIPS because they had
to rely on the force of law in the infringing nation. 38 Even now under
TRIPS, these same corporations cannot bring disputes against
infringing countries themselves. However, with the cooperation and

29.
Id.
30.
See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(Plager, J., dissenting) (describing how the Supreme Court in Schillinger v. United
States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894) determined that there was a constitutional claim to
compensation for the government's use of a patented invention), vacated, No. 20095135, 2012 WL 833892 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 14, 2012).
31.
See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 829, 837-38 (2002) (stating
that Congress passed § 1498 in 1910 and has essentially left it alone ever since).
32,
TRIPS, supra note 2, pmbl.
33.
See id. art. 1 (allowing members to implement TRIPS according to their
"own legal system and practice").
34.
CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 8 (2000).

See id. at 49-100 (noting that the negotiators agreed to extend protection to
35.
"all types of products and processes").
36.
See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES 9 (2009) (citing profits from the pharmaceutical, commercial seed, global
software, and entertainment industries).
37.
SELL, supranote 3, at 96-97.
38.
See id. at 39-43 (describing the U.S. patent protection policies pre-TRIPS
and the factors that set the stage for a global instrument).
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enforcement of the U.S. government, corporations now implicitly have
the backing of the international community. 39 The protections related
to the government use of patents state:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter
of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use
by the government or third parties authorized by the government, the
following provisions shall be respected:

In the case of public non-commercial use, where the government or
contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable
grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the
40
government, the right holder shall be informed promptly ....

TRIPS clearly delineates the need for notification when the
government uses a patent for public noncommercial purposes. 4 1 Even
though the language gives governments a measure of freedom in
defining "promptly," there is no reasonable interpretation that would
deny a patent holder the right to be notified at some point. Virtually
all countries interpreting Article 31 have a notification requirement
in their statutes when issuing a license for public noncommercial
use. 42 Typically, these only require the nation to inform the patent
owner in a reasonable amount of time.43 Clearly § 1498 does not
comply with TRIPS, as it does not require any notification from the
44
government about the seizure.
Article 31 does not limit the grounds of what constitutes public
noncommercial use. The United States interprets this to permit

39.
Id. at 118-20.
40.
TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
41.
Id.
42.
See, e.g., Reese, supra note 14, at 119-20 ("Australia, the United Kingdom,
Israel, and TRIPS all mandate notice to be given to patentees when the government
uses or exploits the patentees' inventions ....
").
43.
See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World
Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 317, 342
(2005) (discussing rules for government use permission in Europe and the role of a
"reasonable period of time" requirement).
44.
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD] & INT'L CTR.
FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. [ICTSD], PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 468 (2005) ("Under U.S.

law, the government may use any patented invention (or authorize its contractor to use
such invention) without providing ...notification to the patent holder ....
");see
Abbott, supra note 43 ("In United States law, the government may use patents without
notice to the patent holder .. ");Reese, supra note 14, at 119-20 (noting that in
contrast to its allies, the United States does not mandate notification of governmental
use). See generally LiLan Ren, Comment, A Comparison of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) and
Foreign Statutes and an Analysis of § 1498(a)'s Compliance with TRIPS, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 1659, 1677 (2005) (explaining that although TRIPS was modeled after U.S. patent
law, it does not necessarily follow that U.S. patent law is in compliance with TRIPS).
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government use for a wide variety of reasons. 45 The provision was
included in TRIPS to appease the United States because it relies on
the broad applicability of § 1498 to any industry. 46 Without
incorporating Article 31, the United States may never have signed
the agreement. However, Article 31 does require a patent owner be
notified as soon as reasonably practical.4 7 As to what constitutes a
rational interpretation of "reasonably," this is a question likely
decided differently by each country. Understanding this reality,
Congress would be wise to use this uncertainty when amending
§ 1498.
While Article 31 does not contain the specific language,
government use in the context of this Note is defined as "public
noncommercial use," while "noncommercial" is synonymous with "notfor-profit. '4 8 Additionally, "public" is defined as use by a government
or a private entity. 49 These definitions are important for patent

owners who do learn of government use to ensure a third party
designated by the government only uses a patent for public nonprofit
reasons and does not exploit the patent for personal gain. Because the
U.S. government indemnifies third parties for use of a patent to fulfill
a government purpose, government contractors have little to lose
50
from exploiting a patent and using the knowledge gained for profit.

45.
See CORREA, supranote 34, at 90-91 (explaining that the United States has
"made extensive use of compulsory licenses for governmental use"). See generally
DEERE, supra note 36, at 81 (explaining in detail compulsory licenses for government
use by nations around the world).
46.
Reichman, supra note 16, at 5 ("It was, indeed, the necessity of
accommodating the United States' reliance on this provision that ultimately led the
TRIPS negotiators to allow WTO Members to grant compulsory licenses for virtually
any purpose under article 31."); see also CORREA, supra note 4, at 313-15 (explaining
the United States' significant historical use of compulsory licensing and Article 31's
grant of flexibility to members that wish to grant compulsory licensing).
47.
See CORREA, supra note 4, at 314 ("Article 31 ... does not limit in any way
the capacity of governments to grant compulsory licenses or undertake government
use.").
48.
See UNCTAD & ICTSD, supra note 44, at 471-72 (finding that the "public
non-commercial use" term is very flexible and allows for a great deal of manipulation
by a government to determine time of notification and payment due).
49.
Id.
50.
See Wyatt, supra note 23, at 83-84 (citing Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) 52.227-1 (2009), which is a standard clause in defense acquisition contracts
indemnifying the government for patent infringement acts by government contractors).
For a more detailed look at the Defense Department's internal requirements for
requiring government contractors to provide notice to the government of use, see
generally FAR 252.227-7039 (1990), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/
dfars/htmllcurrent/252227.htm#252.227-7039.
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III. WHY MEMBERS WILL ENFORCE THE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT

Despite the conclusion the United States is in violation of the
TRIPS requirement, no country will bring a costly dispute case
without good reason, which is almost always money.5 1 The concerns
of corporations are most likely to align with this interest and be the
driving force in the worldwide debate. Already, corporations from the
United States have applied pressure to the government. 52 Foreign
corporations will soon follow due to the incredible unlikelihood they
will learn about government use under the U.S. system.
Within this context there are three main criticisms countries
have against the U.S. system. First, nonexistent discovery has
become a paramount issue for corporations in the pharmaceutical and
53
hi-tech industries who have the majority of their value tied up in IP.
Second, members have an incentive to enforce TRIPS provisions
against countries that vigorously monitor them. 54 Third, there is a
perceived need among other nations to make the dispute system'a
truly credible resolution board that is not afraid to take on large
developed members such as the United States on important
matters. 55 However, these reasons are not exhaustive. Many nations
share the same motives for wanting to bring -a case against the
United States and the notification requirement is a great vehicle for
rival nations to accomplish their goals.
A. Nonexistent Discovery Under U.S. Law
Compared to other nations, the pro-industry public policies of the
56
United States allow for a great deal of meaningful discovery.

51.
See Understanding the WTO-The Panel Process, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis-e/tif e/disp2_e.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2012) (illustrating the steps and the time required to work a claim through the
settlement process); Discussion supra Part II.B (noting that financial interests have
motivated actors such as corporations to seek greater intellectual property protection
through TRIPS).
See Harold C. Wegner & Stephen B. Maebuis, The Global Biotech Patent
52.
Application, in BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW: BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS & BUSINESS
STRATEGIES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, 87, 126 (S.Peter Ludwig ed., 2001) (discussing
the difficulty of proving use in an American court in part because of the difficulty of
meaningful discovery abroad).
53.
See infra Part III.A (describing how U.S. law generally inhibits discovery in
cases against the government).
See infra Part III.B (discussing the need for developing countries to ensure
54.
the viability of TRIPS to be able to check the United States' abuse of power).
55.
See infra Part III.C (describing how members feel the need to ensure that
the settlement process appears fair and unbiased).
56.
But see Wegner & Maebuis, supra note 52, at 126 ("Where a country on the
first level of technology and economic development had a problem with the enforcement
of process patents (where secrecy of the accused infringer's process was safeguarded by
the absence of meaningful discovery), clearly, the problem is geometrically multiplied
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Consequently the large amount of patent discovery in the commercial
context has led to a swarm of litigation.5 7 However, this has not been
the case in the government use arena. Without notification, the odds
a domestic patent holder will learn of government use within the
statutory time limit are minimal. 58 The problem is magnified if the
patent owner resides in a foreign country. Because work done by
government
contractors
is
often
labeled
secret
and
compartmentalized, the outside company will never learn of the use
59
unless by accident or random event.
IBy contrast, the U.S. government typically knows about the use
of patents without permission from the patent owner. Government
contractors are required to report to the Department of Defense or
certain agencies when they use a patent without first acquiring
rights. 60 This is facilitated by a simple mechanism that allows the
third party to list the patents it has used and the reason they were
needed. 61 Because the government will take financial responsibility,
contractors are highly incentivized to quickly and accurately notify
the government.62 Otherwise a contractor could be held liable for
63
patent infringement.
Understanding this fact, government contractors are motivated
to use the patents of others because it allows them to deflect
additional research and development costs associated with fulfilling

in any country which does not have the same pro-industry public policy appreciation of
patents of a Japan.").
57.
For a detailed outline of patent litigation statistics in the United States,
including the number of cases, disposition, and other relevant data, see Univ. of Hous.
Law Ctr., U.S. Patent Litigation Statistics, PATSTATS.COM (last updated Jan. 3, 2012),
http://www.patstats.org/Patstats3.html.
58.
See generally Lipson, supra note 1, at 251 (noting that a patent owner's
chances of discovering government use are even more reduced as § 1498(a) actions have
a strict six-year statute of limitations).
59.
See Wyatt, supra note 23, at 84 (suggesting that because § 1498 protects
contractors "whether the contractors or the government are aware that the contract
calls for infringing activities," without the ability of any private patent owner to
discover much of secret government use, there is little chance that discovery of
government use will be found).
60.
See William C. Bergmann & Bukola Aina, Intellectual Property Rights in
Government Contracting, ANDREWS LITIG. REP.: INTELL. PROP., Aug. 11, 2009, at 6, 8
(laying out the significant FAR clauses relating to patents in government contracting).
61.
See Bergmann & Aina, supra note 60, at 10 (stating that a contractor is
obligated "to notify the government of any allegations of patent or copyright
infringement arising during the performance of the contract ....The government will
pay for the cost of assisting in the defense of a claim unless an indemnification clause
is included in the contract.").
62.
See Wyatt, supra note 23, at 81-84 (discussing the development of
immunity for defense contractors from patent infringement claims if there was
government authorization of use of the patent).
63.
See id. at 82 (stating that prior to the enactment of § 1498, "[clontractors
could be sued directly for infringement and could be subject to injunctive relief as well
as damages").
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government contracts. 64 Without § 1498, the costs of many
government contracts would go up substantially. 65 By allowing
defense contractors to minimize costs through co-opting patent rights,
the government has shifted the cost of national defense to all
patentees filing with the U.S. Patent Office.
Therefore, the true reason a patent holder shouild demand a
notification requirement is to stop competitors from using the patent
for more than simply fulfilling a government contract. While
collecting a royalty from the government is good incentive, it is not
likely to be the main argument for notification. Due to the incredibly
high burden on a patent owner to prove a § 1498 case against the
government, very few plaintiffs are likely to win in court. 66 Indeed,
the money won is typically very small compared to what the patent is
67
worth on the commercial markets.
However, when a contractor uses a patent, they are obligated to
only use it for public noncommercial purposes. 68 If a contractor then
exploits the use of the patent for commercial gains the contractor has
violated the spirit of the law. 6 9 This can happen by acquiring
knowledge only gained through practicing the patent and
subsequently using that expertise to fashion other commercial
products or processes for profit. Without notification, there would be
no discovery of the initial violation of rights, but the patent holder
would also be stripped of the ability to monitor and restrain the
contractor from exploiting the patent for commercial gain. 70 Because

64.
See id. ("This excused the government from having to bargain with patent
owners over licensing fees prior to adopting the patented technology and prevented
patent owners from seeking injunctions against government use of the patented
technology.").
See id. (discussing how, before the enactment of § 1498, contractors were
65.
"exposed to expensive litigation, involving the possibilities of prohibitive injunction,
payment of royalties, rendering of accounts, and payment of punitive damages"
(quoting Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 342-43 (1928))).
See Lipson, supra note 1, at 246-48 (discussing restrictions on § 1498(a)
66.
actions such as jurisdictional limitations and limitations related to the connection of §
1498(a) to eminent domain law).
67.
See id. at 253-57 (discussing how lost profit damages are disfavored and
enhanced damages are unavailable in § 1498(a) actions).
68.
See Wyatt, supra note 23, at 84 ("The clause protects contractors from
infringement claims as long as performance of the contract, according to the
government specification, necessarily results in infringement of an existing patent.").
69.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006) ("For the purposes of this section, the use or
manufacture of an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States
by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government
and with the authorization or consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or
manufacture for the United States.").
70.
See Lipson, supra note 1, at 249 (implying that because patent owners
cannot gain injunctive relief against the government or its contractors, the only remedy
worth obtaining is the knowledge of the use in order to be vigilant against new
products or processes the contractor attempts to commercialize that infringe on the
patent).
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payment from the government is potentially minimal compared with
lost profits, the real loss to the patent owner is the ability to restrain
competitors from gaining a technological advantage the patent owner
had already legally obtained.
B. Necessity of Demanding Compliance with TRIPS
It is in the best interest of developed nations to ensure the
continued viability of TRIPS. Without TRIPS, IP friendly nations
would incur large transaction costs associated with forcing others to
protect their IP.71 This was the case pre-TRIPS, as nations had to
enforce IP rights abroad within the legal system of an infringing
nation. 72 The hometown advantage offered by such a system in
today's increasing global economy would lead to countless billions of
dollars lost in litigation and raised prices on consumer goods
73
worldwide.
Thus, developing countries have a large interest in encouraging
compliance with TRIPS. Although most of the TRIPS articles were
written by the United States and Europe, the method for ensuring
compliance was not. 74 The dispute settlement body was advocated by
the developing nations and is evidence that industrialized countries
75
will yield to smaller nations when enough pressure is applied. If
developing nations are strong-armed to continue enforcing TRIPS by
sacrificing money from vital programs, they will want to ensure
developed nations play by the same set of rules.7 6 TRIPS allows for
any member to believe they are on equal bargaining terms with the
giants of the world. 77 Without TRIPS, a small nation operating alone
cannot obtain fair trade agreements with countries like the United
States and other major trading members. 78 If, however, the nation
operates in conjunction with other developing nations via an
international agreement, it stands a far better chance of securing IP

71.
See SELL, supra note 3, at 80-84 (discussing a trade-based approach to IP
and historical frameworks for enforcing IP rights).
72.
See id. at 83 ("[G]overnment agencies dealt with IP problems on an ad hoc
basis; US embassies offered to help companies as problems arose.").
73.
See supra note 71.
74.
See Anthony Noss, Note, In Defense of TRIPS. It Only Seems Imperialistic,
1 CYBARIS 154, 158 (2010) (discussing the influence of developing countries in the
drafting of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of TRIPS).
75.
See id. ("The Chairman's report clearly presented two approaches: (1) the
West's all-encompassing agreement approach; and (2) the developing countries'
demarcated approach.").
76.
See infra Parts III.B, IV.A (discussing the United States' manipulation of
other countries into settling in its favor to avoid expensive disputes and the resulting
attempt by developing countries to check U.S. power by enforcing TRIPS).
See generally TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 7 (setting out the principles of
77.
TRIPS).
78.
See infra Part IV.B.
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policies more favorable to its citizens. Strength in numbers, coupled
with the viability of TRIPS, remains vital to the developing nations of
0
the world.
To accomplish this goal, developing nations will seek an ally to
thwart perceived U.S. imperialism. After all, the United States has
been incredibly vigilant in monitoring IP violations in many of these
nations since TRIPS was signed in 1994. 79 Many times enforcement
80
of foreign patent rights was demanded over public health concerns
While a developing nation is unlikely to succeed in bring a dispute
against the United States, their best strategy is to combine their
81
interests with a developed nation.
Many developed nations also recognize the need to ensure the
viability of TRIPS to keep U.S. trade relations in check. A member
such as the European Union would be a difficult opponent in a fight
against the United States. Like the developing nations, the European
Union has a vested interest in preventing the United States from
continuing to flaunt powers prohibited by TRIPS.8 2 Although the
European Union has followed the laws set by TRIPS, the United
States has enjoyed a unique position within the trading world by both
83
writing and selectively enforcing rules without repercussion.
Ultimately, a developed nation supported by several concerned
countries with third-party interests allows for an implicit system of
checks and balances. Though some of these concerned countries have
been quieted in recent years,8 4 impoverished nations have it in their
interest to enforce the TRIPS agreements against U.S. violations.
When combined with the motives of developed nations, there is a very
real threat to U.S. interests if a suit is brought.
C. Need for a Strong Dispute Settlement Process
In addition to encouraging international compliance with TRIPS
provisions, both developed and developing nations alike will feel the

79.
See DEERE, supra note 36, at 157 (highlighting U.S. disputes against
developing countries); Noss, supra note 74, at 170-73 (listing all TRIPS disputes from
1996 to 2009).
See DEERE, supra note 36, at 157. See generally Letter from 45 Civil Society
80.
Groups to Francis Gurry, Dir. Gen., World Intellectual Prop. Org. (Nov. 30, 2011),
available at http://infojustice.org/archives/6285 (generalizing the complaints of nations
with respect to public health issues).
81.
See infra Part IV.B (describing how a successful attack against the United
States would require a developed nation to bring the dispute with the support of
developing nations).
82.
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the European Union's interests in stopping
U.S. rule-changing tactics).
See infra Part IV.B (detailing the United States' various rule-changing
83.
strategies).
84.
See infra note 99 (discussing how smaller members are afraid to tackle the
United States for fear of alienation and future punishment).
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need to ensure the viability of the DSU. Primarily, it must have the
necessary power to enforce TRIPS violations while appearing fair and
unbiased.8 5 The DSU is the enforcement mechanism of TRIPS and
86
comprises a panel of experts who preside as judges in a dispute.
When a country believes another member is in violation of TRIPS, the
appropriate recourse is to bring a dispute.8 7 If a country is found in
violation by the dispute settlement body it can force a nation to
change its laws and even face trade sanctions.8 8 For the
industrialized world, forcing compliance from nations with little or no
IP protection is a major concern. Just as big a worry is ensuring
smaller members feel the process equally protects their ability to
raise disputes against developed countries.
The United States has continually used the DSU to force nations
89
into bilateral discussions, trade concessions, and TRIPS-plus
requirements. Between 1996 and 2009, the United States brought a
total of fifteen DSU cases related to TRIPS with nine against
developed countries. 90 Of the fifteen total, 80 percent of the disputes
the United States initiated ended in a settlement. 91 However, because
the United States brings a dispute against another nation and
prevails does not always translate into winning in real life. The
United States has secured the implementation of TRIPS provisions
against developing nations such as Pakistan, India, Argentina, and
Brazil through either decision or settlement. 92 With the exception of
Pakistan and China, the practical results on the ground have
generally been mixed. Indeed, many nations have passed legislation
to implement TRIPS but have dragged their feet in terms of

85.
Compare Brian Manning & Srividhya Ragavan, The Dispute Settlement
Process of the WTO: A Normative Structure to Achieve UtilitarianObjectives, 79 UMKC
L. REV. 1, 1-6 (2010) (finding the current dispute process severely lacking in
enforcement capability), and William New, Retaliation in WTO Disputes: Is It
Working?, NAT'L J. DAILY (Feb. 25, 2008), http://nationaljournal.com/daily/retaliation-

in-wto-disputes-is-it-working--20080225?mrefid=site search (analyzing the deficiencies
in the DSU and balancing the needs of members to decide if the DSU can ultimately be
saved), with Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No
24: Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net
Benefits, 28 INT'L L. 1095, 1102-04 (1994) (discussing the qualities of the dispute
settlement mechanism right after passage).
86.
For a detailed outline of the DSU and the timeline for a dispute, see
generally Manning & Ragavan, supra note 85.
87.
See Understandingthe WTO-The Panel Process, supra note 51 (explaining
the dispute settlement process).
88.

Id.

89.
See DEERE, supra note 36, at 12 (defining TRIPS-plus as requirements in
addition to the baseline TRIPS provisions that have been imposed on members in trade
agreements).
90.
Id. at 157; Noss, supra note 74, at 162.
91.
Noss, supra note 74, at 162.
92.
DEERE, supra note 36, at 158-59.
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enforcement. 93 Evidently the United States has the ability to coerce
other nations into agreeing to higher enforcement standards but has
a hard time forcing actual application of the law.
To correct the implementation problem the United States has
used the power of the DSU to implement favorable policies upon itself
in a different way. Nations around the world have feared the
possibility of a dispute with the United States and typically acquiesce
to demands through settlement or concession. 94 If a nation decides to
go only through the motions for enforcement, the United States can
threaten to impose yet higher trade punishments. Because the United
States considers the DSU a powerful instrument to use in imposing
its interpretation of TRIPS, other nations will eventually use the
same tool against the United States. However, to date only two
developing countries have brought DSU cases against developed
nations. 95
The European Union by contrast has shown willingness in the
past to attack the United States through the DSU. Although the
trading partnership between the United States and the European
Union is the strongest in the world, 96 each has brought at least three
disputes against the other. 97 The major difference between the two
members has been third-party support. Under the DSU, the
European Union was flanked with several third-party members
supporting it in the majority of cases against the United States. 98 By
comparison the United States has never had third-party support
against the European Union. 99 With the European Union's ability to
consolidate support to attack the United States head-on, it has the
best chance to bring together nations in support of any move against
the United States. This is a major problem for the United States.
Ultimately, any developed nation attempting to gather support
will need to convince the developing world to set a precedent of using
the DSU to demand U.S. compliance with TRIPS. Although the DSU
has had a difficult time rendering decisions against the United

93.
Id.
94.
See, e.g., Manning & Ragavan, supra note 85 (presenting two case studies
of developing countries that got involved in disputes with the United States and turned
to measures such as settlement and legislative acquiescence).
95.
Noss, supra note 74, app. at 170-71 (noting the cases brought by India and
Brazil).
96.
See
Bilateral
Relations-United
States,
EUR.
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunitiesibilateral-relations/countries/unitedstates (last visited Apr. 1, 2012) ("The EU and the US enjoy the most integrated
economic relationship in the world, illustrated by unrivalled levels of mutual
investment stocks, reaching over €2.1 trillion.").
97.
See Noss, supra note 74, app. at 170-73 (listing cases each has brought
against the other).
98.
See infra Part IV.B.
99.
See infra Part IV.B.
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States, 100 a large enough contingent of members backing a party like
the European Union would lend considerable credit to a dispute.
Since implementing TRIPS the number of developing nations
recognizing the need to enter the fray by signing onto disputes as
third parties has skyrocketed. 10 1 If a sizable number of nations
decided to combine their efforts and cement the power of the DSU,
the United States would be forced to reexamine its policies regarding
IP enforcement.' 0 2 As the most viable path is to bring disputes
against the United States for obvious violations, the DSU would be
hard-pressed to rule in favor of the United States if a dispute was
brought for an obvious lack of notification requirement. Assuming the
DSU is looking for a reason to finally rule against the United States,
the WTO will be highly motivated to encourage a DSU case to
demonstrate a lack of favoritism.

IV. USING WTO VIOLATIONS TO EFFECT POLICY CHANGE:
WHY THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO AMEND § 1498
BEFORE A WTO MEMBER BRINGS A DISPUTE

As hinted in the previous section, the rest of the world believes
the United States has used a range of controversial policies to
advance its position on IP rights. This Part explores the major
complaints about U.S. policy and determines that a competing nation
will likely bring a dispute for smaller TRIPS violations first, before
forcing the DSU to rule on more controversial issues. The lack of a
notification requirement to patent owners fits this description
perfectly. If the United States will not amend § 1498 to comply with
TRIPS then the rest of the world will likely force implementation.
The United States should understand that many members have a
host of other policy issues with the United States and using the
obvious notification violation could easily be used to start a wave of
change in U.S. trade policy.

100.
See Lina M. Mont6n, Comment, The Inconsistency Between Section 301 and
TRIPS: Counterproductive with Respect to the Future of International Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights?, 9 MARQ. INTLL. PROP. L. REV. 387, 410-12 (2005)

(explaining that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body tends to ingratiate itself with both
powers). But see Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States-US Patents Code,
WT/DS224/1 (Feb. 7, 2001) (showcasing the ability of a developing country to challenge

the United States in litigation).
101.
Noss, supra note 74, at 169.
102.
See infra Part IV.B (describing how countries could take on the United
States if they work together).
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A. Major U.S. Trade Policy Complaints
Members around the world have expressed dissatisfaction with
the United States regarding both TRIPS implementation and
compliance. Specific complaints have centered on Special 301
powers, 10 3 trade concessions, and TRIPS-plus requirements. While
purposefully avoiding the implementation of TRIPS domestically, the
United States has argued that none of these measures violate the
spirit of the TRIPS agreement. 10 4 Under the U.S. theory, claimed
patents are tremendously important for inducing private companies
and individuals to risk their time and money toward inventing new
products and processes. 10 5 To prevent any free rider issues,
governments need to give patents tremendous protections or risk
losing technological advantages to other nations. 10 6 However,
complaining nations would argue that although a certain level of
patent protection worldwide is appropriate, forcing countries to
implement the U.S. version of patent law through controversial
policies undermines their economies and forces indentured servitude.
1.

Special 301

The current version of Special 301, added to § 301 in the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, demands that the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) identify priority foreign
countries (PFCs) that deny "adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights" or "deny fair and equitable market access
to United States persons" who rely on those protections. 10 7 Once
designated a PFC,10 8 countries that do not amend their laws or enter
into trade negotiations face unilateral retaliation through sanctions.
On its face, the USTR's Special 301 powers are a mandate for

103.

See

US

Lists IP

Complaints in

Special 301 Report, INTELL.

PROP.

PROGRAMME (Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switz.), May 5, 2010,
available at http://ictsd.org/i/newsfbridgesweekly/75198 (noting the many critics of and
complaints about the report).
104.
See infra Part IV.A. 1 (detailing the Special 301 powers).
105.

See NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF TRADEMARKS AND

DESIGNS 256-57 (2d ed. 2011) ("Patents are an important mechanism to induce private
companies to risk their money, time and resources in inventing new processes and
products ... ").
106.
See SELL, supra note 3, at 14 ("[I]ndividuals and firms will be unlikely to
make costly investments in innovation or creation if imitators can reproduce these
innovations or creations . . . 'at little or no cost'....

107.
19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006).
108.
To look at the current list of forty-one countries on either the Priority
Watch List, Watch List, or Section 306 monitoring list, see generally OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE

REPRESENTATIVE,

2010

http://www.ustr.gov/webfm-send1906.

SPECIAL 301

REPORT

(2010),

available at
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unilateral action to force nations harming the IP interests of the
United States to more vigorously enforce those rights.10 9
Although the USTR has been directed to use the Special 301
powers only as a tool for monitoring countries, it remains a source of
controversy among members and has been a constant concern for the
international community since its enactment.1 10 Ultimately, the
unilateral nature of the power allows the U.S. government to affect
nations around the world without a check on its power. 1 Although
the use of Special 301 powers is facially invalid under TRIPS, the
United States has not repealed it and has indirectly declared it will
enforce its rights against infringing countries whether the DSU
11 2
permits it or not.
Countries searching for an argument against this power will
focus on Article 23 of the DSU, which requires that members bring IP
disputes to the dispute settlement body. Coupled with the fact the
United States and other members agreed on the rejection of
unilateral retaliation, 1 3 the use of Special 301 powers would seem
facially invalid. However, the USTR has avoided this interpretation
by stating the use of Special 301 procedures are appropriate where
the WTO's dispute resolution process is used in conjunction." 4 In
other words, so long as a dispute is initiated the United States
believes it can use its Special 301 powers in combination with the
DSU. Countries designated as PFCs have acted in a risk-adverse
manner toward the United States because of the uncertain validity of
the Special 301 procedures. 1 5 As a result, these countries are likely
to enact new legislation or enter bilateral agreements before the
6
USTR has a chance to implement sanctions."
Europe has taken the lead in the fight against the Special 301
procedures. In 1999, the European Community brought a DSU case
against the United States concerning § 301's compatibility with the

109.
See, e.g., Robert J. Pechman, Seeking MultilateralProtection for Intellectual
Property: The United States 'TRIPS" over Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 179,
199-202 (1998) (describing scenarios in which the United States may use Special 301).
110.
See DONALD G. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL
CAPATALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 125 (2004) ("The

target countries include both industrialized as well as less developed countries, though
a disproportionate number of actions have been taken against the [least developed
countries].").
111.
See id. (describing the United States' seemingly uninhibited use of the
power).
112.
Mont6n, supra note 100, at 405.
113.
Noss, supra note 74, at 160.
114.
Mont6n, supra note 100, at 405.
115.
See id. at 405-07 ("[Mlany countries have little choice but to comply [with
the United States' wishes]. The typical outcome of Section 301 investigations has been
new legislation in the country in question and/or bilateral agreements in which the
countries promise to change their practices.").
116.
Id. at 407 n.132.
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DSU. 117 Although the WTO found § 301 was in "prime facie [sic]
violation" of Article 23 of the DSU, it ultimately cowered in the
international spotlight and ruled in favor of the United States to the
dismay of the European Community.1 18 The ruling was limited
however to the specific case and did not determine the overall
compatibility of § 301 with TRIPS. 119 By evading the decisive issue of
Special 301 validity, the DSU board has implicitly acknowledged the
widespread opinion that it is afraid to rule against U.S. interests. The
United States was a major proponent of the TRIPS agreement,
120
including the lack of unilateral action against other nations.
Clearly sidestepping the United States is warning enough that while
the DSU may wish to rule against the United States, it was not
prepared to do so without a wave of support behind it.
While the United States claimed victory from the 1999
proceedings, the European Union and other developed nations have
learned from the case. 121 Certainly the level of indignation felt by the
European Union has not subsided and will eventually lead to another
dispute centering on the ultimate validity of the Special 301 powers.
But as discussed earlier, obvious hedging by the dispute settlement
body during the European Union's previous attempt has made a full
attack on the Special 301 procedures a risky venture. While the
United States "has paid a great price of its international credit and
image for its reckless waving of the 'big stick,'' 122 geopolitics still
reigns supreme. In the end, the WTO has implicitly shown it will not
rule against its richest member without a solid foundation of both
violations and momentum for enforcing the rule of law.
2.

Manipulation of TRIPS Through Trade Concessions

Corporations in the United States have declined in their relative
ability to compete in key manufacturing industries internationally.
Consequently, the U.S. government has -been forced to level the
123
playing field by using its powers and influence around the world.
To that end the United States uses a combination of both power and
rule-oriented diplomacy to achieve its trade goals. 124 Threats of a
dispute in the WTO can be at least as effective as a full proceeding.
The United States has vigorously enforced its IP rights abroad and

117.
118.

Id. at 409.
Id. at 410-11 (citation omitted).

119.

Id. at 411.

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Noss, supra note 74.
Mont6n, supra note 100, at 409-11.
Id. at 411.
See id. at 410-11 (discussing aggressive use of U.S. influence).
RICHARDS, supra note 110, at 126.
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has been the complaining party in the vast majority of DSU cases.125
However, the United States has also initiated proceedings, only to
126
settle, in even more instances.
The time and money spent by a country in defense of a possible
TRIPS violation can be staggering. 127 Developing countries may lack
the resources or the personnel to adequately fight a complaint.12 8
Instead of spending resources on a defense of IP rights, many of these
countries simply settle their differences at the negotiating table. 129 As
the argument goes, the United States has taken advantage of other
nations' need to feed their starving populations by demanding trade
130
concessions and forcing favorable trade agreements.
Additionally, the United States has written to governments of
infringing nations in an effort to require TRIPS-plus reforms,
improve enforcement, and move the global IP debate in the direction
U.S. policymakers would want. 131 Through intimidation, forcing out
opposition leaders, and actively lobbying government officials, the
United States has pressured developing countries to comply with
132
enforcement standards typically above TRIPS requirements.

125.
See generally Dispute Settlement-Disputes by Country/Territory, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispuby-country-e.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2012) (charting the various disputes and complainants).
126.
See Noss, supra note 74, at 162 ('Thirteen of the twenty-five TRIPs
disputes between 1996 and 2009, or 52%, ended with a Mutually Agreed Solution.
Notably, of the thirteen disputes with Mutually Agreed Solutions, the United States
was the complainant twelve times, or over 92% of the time." (footnote omitted)).
127.
See Roderick Abbott, Are Developing Countries Deterred from Using the
WTO Dispute Settlement System? 11-12 (European Ctr. for Int'l Political Econ.,
Working Paper No. 1, 2007), available at http://www.ecipe.orglpublications/ecipeworking-papers/are-developing-countries-deterred-from-using-the-wto-disputesettlement-system/PDF ("Although developing countries vary significantly in terms of
trading profiles, they generally face three primary challenges if they are to participate
effectively in the WTO dispute settlement system. These challenges are: (i) a relative
lack of legal expertise in WTO law; (ii) constrained financial resources, including the
hiring of outside counsel; and (iii) fear of political and economic pressure. We can
roughly categorize these as constraints of law, money and politics." (quoting Gregory C.
Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for Developing Country Adaptation, 5
WORLD TRADE REV. 177, 177 (2006))).
128.
Id.
129.
See generally OXFAM INT'L, SIGNING AWAY THE FUTURE: HOW TRADE AND
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN RICH AND POOR COUNTRIES UNDERMINE

DEVELOPMENT (2007),
available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/
files/Signing%20Away%20the%2oFuture.pdf
("[Allthough
developing-country
governments have proved themselves increasingly assertive at the WTO [disputes
level] and in some regional and bilateral agreements, the balance of power in current
negotiations remains tipped heavily in [favor] of rich countries and large, politically
influential corporations.").
130.

Id.

131.
See DEERE, supra note 36, at 161 (identifying several cases where foreign
trade ambassadors received complaints and other pressure from the United States
about disagreeable positions taken by delegates in Geneva).
132.

Id.
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Representative of this practice is the United States posting legal and
technical advisors in developing country capitals and
sending letters
133
I
and officials from the U.S. Patent and USTR offices.
The idea of the United States forcing trade concessions is not
fiction or minor international gamesmanship. In the case of Pakistan,
the United States tipped its hand to the world by showing a mere
threat of U.S. sanctions can force a developing nation to take TRIPS
implementation more seriously. 134 Through threatening to revoke aid
and end talks for a bilateral trade agreement, the United States
135
forced Pakistan to address its massive copyright piracy issue.
Pakistan clearly could not afford to lose its future economic lifeline to
the United States and decided that from a cost-benefit perspective,
enforcing foreign IP rights was more valuable than billions of dollars
in lost aid money. 136 The question then is why would any developing
country decide differently when faced with a similar decision? The
answer is obviously that instead of resisting TRIPS, developing
nations have decided to give in to U.S. demands and enforce not only
TRIPS, but TRIPS-plus measures designed to provide a higher bar of
13 7
protection for IP than originally intended.
Prior to the formations of TRIPS, another form of forcing trade
concessions was the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act signed into law during
the Reagan administration. 138 This law specifically authorized the
President to manipulate global trade by negotiating international IP
agreements to lower trade barriers preventing knowledge based goods
and services. 139 By clarifying the conditions under the § 301 powers of
the USTR, Congress allowed the President to set up bilateral 'trade
140
agreements faster and with less overall debate.
The USTR can then use this process to convince nations to sign
quickly and under terms favorable to the United States or face a long

133.
134.
135.
136.
industries
137.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 163.
See id. (describing pressure from the pharmaceutical and agrochemical
on Pakistan regarding TRIPS implementation).
See Jean R. Homere, Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: A View
from the United States, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 337 (Daniel
J. Gervais ed., 2007) (explaining that from the perspective of developing countries,
particularly LDCs, TRIPS compliance stimulates foreign direct investment, which
often outweighs the short.term loss in economic activity caused by the elimination of
piracy).
138.
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 58(b) et seq. (2006)) (clarifying the conditions in which unfair
trade cases under § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 can be pursued).
139.

RICHARDS, supra note 110, at 125.

140.
See DEERE, supra note 36, at 159 (discussing USTR creation of Special 301
reports and Watch Lists and how the United States used these as negotiating chips to
create bilateral trade agreements).
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and drawn out process through Congress. In economic terms, nations
needing to export to the United States could potentially lose millions
of dollars for every day it is prevented from trading by waiting out the
U.S. legislative process.141 While equal concessions between two
bargaining nations can be an effective bargaining tool, the use of this
Act to coerce nations has dictated much policy. 142 Although this Act is
seen as the basis for the proposal made by the United States to move
IP to the WTO, the § 301 powers of the USTR are still available to use
against other countries. If a starving nation must choose between
signing a trade agreement that demands higher IP enforcement in
order to trade with the United States faster and under better overall
terms, they will leap at the opportunity.
A similar measure used by the United States to force trade
concession is the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 143 The
GSP is utilized to force other nations to implement TRIPS and
enforce provisions most favorable to U.S. interests. 144 It was created,
in theory, to help improve large market access for the exports of poor
countries. 145 However, the USTR has manipulated the GSP on
several occasions to force a country wanting financial breaks to meet
higher criteria relating to its IP rights.
This was exemplified in 1997 when the USTR reduced the GSP
concessions to Argentina due t6 an alleged annual loss of $500 million
by the pharmaceutical industry. 146 As a result of the GSP action,
Argentina's industries lost about $260 million per year to the United
States until the measures were settled. 147 The Argentine government
decided to pass legislation favorable to the United States, although
its effectiveness has since been called into question. 148 From an
international perspective this is exactly the kind of unilateral action
TRIPS was intended to stop. 149 However, the USTR has used this
measure in other places, such as South Africa, and there is no

141.
See infra Part IV.B (describing how the United States will use economic
tactics to coerce nations to bypass costly litigation and settle on terms favorable to the
United States).
142.
RICHARDS, supra note 110, at 126.
143.
See generally DEERE, supra note 36, at 161 (noting that the GSP was
instituted on January 1, 1976 by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984).
144.
See id. at 160 (discussing how the United States on repeated occasions has
threatened to withdraw GSP benefits to pressure decision making in Brazil and
Pakistan).
145.
Id.
146.
See, e.g., SELL, supra note 3, at 136 (reviewing the PhRMA-inspired U.S.
sanctions against Argentina for lax TRIPS compliance).
147.
Id.
Id.
148.
149.
See generally TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31 (noting that the statute was
passed by the United States and the European Commission to prevent unilateral
action).
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indication the United States will stop employing this tactic to force
150
more favorable TRIPS implementation elsewhere.
While the United States does not use these measures frequently,
they allow the United States to enhance its bargaining position
against virtually any nation. Based on simple observation, some may
suggest the United States simply absolve itself of any international
obligation such as TRIPS and employ unilateral measures against
nations to improve IP enforcement. 15 1 However, the United States
has wisely chosen to use TRIPS to implement its preferred IP
standards and laws. In effect, the United States forces the world to
adopt IP measures most favorable to its interests while reserving
unilateral options of enforcement. By staying behind the veil of the
WTO, developing nations have little recourse in the fight over
competing international interests. Although many developing nations
are at the same stage of development the United States was at not
long ago, they may have taken too long to get to the party and are
subsequently shut out in the cold. Therefore it becomes obvious that
the rest of the world will bring the fight to the United States before
the trading gap becomes even larger.
B. Likely Plaintiffs in a Dispute Against the United States
Rules mutable games involve a player (typically a child) who can
change the rules during the course of the game to secure a win. 152 In
everyday life, adults often allow this behavior for various reasons
including keeping the child peaceful and cooperative. Fundamentally,
rules mutable games demonstrate that a rational actor is likely to
think strategically to achieve a range of goals without regard to set
rules. 153 On the world stage, the United States has played the role of
a child to perfection. The economic value of IP rights has led the
United States to use suspect tactics to coerce other nations into
positions most favorable to its interests. Given the tremendous
growing value of IP worldwide, the United States will continue to
redefine the IP rights of other nations to obtain even more
concessions until a member decides to stop the game.
Luckily for the United States, there are not many viable
candidates to bring a dispute. A smaller member risks alienation and
future punishment from the United States regardless of the outcome
in court. In addition, developing nations typically lack the financial
and intellectual resources to bring an adequate case for alleged

150.
See DEERE, supra note 36, at 160 ("[T]he United States placed South Africa
on its Special 301 Review Watch List and scheduled an 'out-of-cycle' review .
.
151.
152.

RICHARDS, supra note 110, at 132.
PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOPSOHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 132 (1996).

153.

Id. at 132-33.
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TRIPS violations. 154 Only when forced into a dispute settlement will
a developing nation take on the most influential member of the
WTO. 155 Thus the most likely candidate is a large developed nationflanked by third-party support-that has little to lose from the
backlash of the United States and everything to gain in trading
power. Alas, the task of determining the right candidate is relatively
easy, as every member can see that the United States law is not in
156
conformity with TRIPS and some have publicly complained
The European Union has been among the most vocal in
opposition to U.S. IP policy. According to one report by the European
Union, the practice of failing to notify patent owners is "particularly
detrimental for foreign rights-holders because they will generally not
be able to detect government use and are thus very likely to miss the
opportunity to initiate an administrative claims procedure." 157 In the
same report the European Union goes on to say that although the
United States agreed to Article 31 of TRIPS demanding notice to
patent owners, "no action has been taken by the US ... to bring their
legislation into conformity with [the] provision.' 158 These statements
stem from the United States' early recognition that TRIPS required a
much lower IP standard compared to the rights it desired to obtain
abroad. 15 9 By forcing countries around the world to accept TRIPSplus requirements in trade agreements, the United States has
attempted to write its own future.
The European Union by contrast has a vested interest in
stopping the United States from using rule-changing tactics to
remain the most powerful trading nation and continuing to shape the
international standards governing IP. 160 However, this does not mean
the European Union has not attempted to implement compliant
versions of U.S. policies in their own laws. Following many of the
same tactics of the United States, it has imposed TRIPS-plus
measures on other countries. 161 In addition, it has developed a more
compliant version of the Special 301 procedure used by the United
States. 162 However, the European Union has the distinct

154.
See Manning & Ragavan, supra note 85, at 5 ("[T]he power imbalance, in
practice, skews the system in favor [of] the developed countries and to the detriment of
developing Members.").
155.
See id.
156.
CORREA, supra note 34, at 90 (discussing the European Union's disgust
with § 1498).
157.
Id.
158.
Id. at 92-93.
159.
See SELL, supra note 3, at 119-20 (noting industry representatives'
dissatisfaction with TRIPS protections and the U.S. government's strengthening of §
301 and Special 301 powers).
160.
The EU and U.S. economies account for roughly half of the world's GDP.
BilateralRelations-BilateralRelations, supra note 96.
161.

DEERE, supra note 36, at 176-77.

162.

Id.
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disadvantage of not having its violating statutes in place before
TRIPS was signed, unlike U.S. law. The European Union has
essentially played catch up ever since. The only way for a member
like the European Union to level the playing field is to bring the fight
to the United States and change the balance of power.

C. UnderstandingConsequences: The Grim Outlook for U.S.
Trade Policies Without a Notification Requirement
There are several ways that members may choose to achieve the
163
goal of reducing the United States' influence on IP enforcement.
One involves imposing trade related sanctions on the United
States. 164 However, tariffs on U.S. products would only hurt both
foreign investors and the native populations. Additionally, such a
unilateral action would make the members guilty of the exact sort of
abuse they are accusing the United States of to this day. Another
possibility would be to use TRIPS concessions to cross-retaliate. 165
This would involve a situation similar to the case in Brazil where it
chose to raise tariffs on certain U.S. goods because they brought a
DSU case for compulsory licensing issues. 166 While this strategy did
have some success, the suspension of obligations under TRIPS has a
negative impact on a domestic legal system and is not considered to
167
be a sufficient option in most cases.
A third option would be for a nation, most likely a developing
one, to lodge a nonviolation complaint against U.S. policies. A
nonviolation complaint is not based on a direct violation of a provision
of TRIPS. 168 Instead the complaint is based on the loss of benefit
members would reasonably expect to gain from entering TRIPS with
other members who have not directly violated the agreement. 16 9 The
complaint would need to be focused on the trade concessions and
forced bilateral agreements the United States has imposed on certain
members. However, this strategy is unlikely to succeed for many of
the same reasons the DSU choose not to rule on the Special 301
powers. 170 This of course assumes the DSU will not rule against the
United States for measures that have actually violated the agreement

163.
See PIRES DE CARVALHO, supra note 105, at 550-53 (discussing methods of
cross-retaliation against members that do not comply with TRIPS).
164.
See id. (discussing the use of sanctions as a possible instrument for
controlling noncompliance).
165.
Id. (discussing cross-retaliation as an option for reprimanding members
whose actions are inconsistent with TRIPS).
166.
Id. at 552.
167.
Id. at 552-53.
168.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 64(2) (discussing the application of dispute
settlement mechanisms).
169.
CORREA, supra note 34, at 554.
170.
See supra Part IV.A. 1 (discussing the current version of Special 301).
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in the past. Also, this would not include repercussions for possible
future violations and would not deter the United States from keeping
those conflicting measures in its back pocket for leverage in
negotiations.
From the position of the plaintiffs, the best solution is a more
subtle option. As an opening shot across the bow, the dispute needs to
center around a topic that is not seen as a vital to the average U.S.
citizen, has a high likelihood of success, and can set the foundation
for a precedent of change. The lack of a notification requirement is
that solution. If the United States is unwilling to implement the
requirements of TRIPS into its law, another member may force the
change while also exploiting other U.S. trade policies in the process.
A member wanting to achieve its goal of better trading deals can
use the lack of notification in the U.S. patent system to set a
precedent of contrary rulings. To do this it must find a way to
persuade the DSU to be aggressive against U.S. policy. Bringing a
major violation such as Special 301 powers is the incorrect path.
Instead, bringing a dispute centered on an obvious U.S. infraction can
build up the confidence of the DSU to rule against the United States
in later suits.
Questions surrounding the validity of § 1498 have surfaced ever
since the adoption of TRIPS in 1994. In addition to the stated
opinions by the European Union, 171 the United States was directly
asked if § 1498 complies with TRIPS Article 31 by both China 172 and
the European Union. 173 In response to China, the United States
skirted the issue by simply responding that it is in compliance with
Article 31 and U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations require that
contracting officers consult with legal counsel whenever dealing with
matters under § 1498.174 Nowhere in the comment does the United
175
States actually respond to the lack of notification to patent owners.
However, the United States answered with slightly more vigor to
the European Union's line of questioning. When asked how the
United States views compliance of § 1498 with Article 31, though
there is substantial evidence that infringements go undetected
because use is classified, the United States responded that it could
not answer the European Union's question until presented with the

171.
CORREA, supra note 34.
172.
Trade Policy Review Body Meeting Minutes, Trade Policy Review: United
States, at 23-24, WT/TPRfMI126/Add.2 (Mar. 25, 2004).
173.
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Review
of Legislation in the Fields of Patents, Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated
Circuits, Protection of Undisclosed Information and Control of Anti-Competitive
Practicesin ContractualLicenses: United States, at 10-13, IP/Q3USA/1 (May 1, 1998).
174.
Trade Policy Review Body Meeting Minutes, supra note 172, at 24.
175.
Id.
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actual evidence. 176 The United States went on to note that Article 73
of TRIPS recognizes that members can take actions in relation to
patent use deemed necessary to protect its national security
177
interests.
Article 73 of TRIPS is seen as a catch-all exception to all other
provisions. 178 Invoking nations may attempt to circumvent a dispute
by claiming the issue is related to national security and not in the
domain of the DSU. However, there is nothing in the negotiating
history of the provision or the actual text to support the view that the
179
DSU cannot apply to so-called national security exceptions.
Indeed the DSU is not likely to be subject to a national security
exception per Article 1 because if members were able to simply invoke
Article 73 to avoid litigation there would be little reason for the DSU
to exist.' 8 0 Thus, whether the United States can issue blanket
approval of third-party use without notifying patent owners appears
reviewable by the DSU despite Article 73.181 If the United States
cannot hide behind the veil of Article 73, it would appear it has no
defense against a dispute brought for the invalidity of § 1498.182
Without an Article 73 defense the lack of notification to patent
owners is precisely the low hanging fruit an ambitious member is
looking to exploit. Besides § 1498 having been shown to be facially
invalid, the United States has shown willful noncompliance by
requiring notification to patent owners through other means. The
United States has signed free trade agreements with several nations
that require it and others to implement the provisions of Article 31 in
TRIPS.' 8 3 A typical trade agreement will require that the patent
owner receive full compensation and notice as required in Article
31.184 Also, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

176.
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 173, at 12.
177.
Id.
178.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 73(b) ("Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed.., to prevent a Member from taking any action which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests ....
179.
UNCTAD & ICTSD, supra note 44, at 804.
180.
Id.
181.

See generally Trade Policy Review Body Meeting Minutes, supra note 172

(reviewing U.S. approval of third party patents by the DSU).
182.
Even without a defense, however, the United States may simply ignore the
DSU's decision and not amend the law, so the penalty imposed must truly be sufficient
to force implementation. See Dispute Settlement Body Report, United States-Section
110(5) of the US Copyright Act-Recourse to Arbitration Under Article 25 of the DSU,
WT1DS160/ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001) (threatening the United States with suspension of
concessions under TRIPS when the United States failed to adopt the recommendations
of the Dispute Settlement Body within a reasonable period of time).
183.
See infra Part V.A.2 (discussing the amendment of Chinese patent law to
comply with TRIPS due to pressure from the United States).
See Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Intellectual Property Protection After TRIPS: An
184.
Asian Experience, in INTERPRETING AND IMPLEMENTING THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: IS IT
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requires the United States to notify patent owners in signatory
countries about the use of their patent.1 8 5 If Congress contemplated
the need to notify in NAFTA, yet left § 1498 unchanged, this is clear
evidence that the lack of action was deliberate.
For an enterprising member there is not likely to be a clearer
case of a TRIPS violation by the United States. Industrialized nations
looking to change the rules of the game against the United States will
use the lack of notification to patent owners to change U.S. trade
policy. Granted, there is no guarantee that a victory in a DSU case
like this can create the desired domino effect. However the
alternative is to allow the United States to continue dominating
international geopolitics and implementing more favorable IP rights.

V. THE U.S. DEFENSIVE STRATEGY

One wonders if the United States has seen the writing on the
wall. Major players on the international stage have pressured the
United States to explain the lack of a notification requirement in
§ 1498.186 This is despite the contradictory evidence of the inclusion of
such a requirement in various other statutes and agreements.
Regardless, the United States has the ability to control its destiny by
proactively amending § 1498 to prevent other nations from using the
noncompliance for personal gain. However, if the United States
chooses to procrastinate in amending the law, there are possible
defenses to an eventual DSU case.
A. Worldwide Government Use and Compulsory License Statutes

Section 1498 is a unique provision when compared to similar
statutes around the world. Other industrialized nations explicitly
claim the need to notify patent owners when the government
subsumes their rights for public noncommercial reasons. To
illustrate, the United Kingdom, China, and the European Union are
good representations of the industrialized world's view on notifying
the patent owner.
Each of these countries mandate the government notify patent
owners when their rights have been infringed. Some argue the reason
is corporations have used their influence to provide for more

FAIR? 71, 83 (Justin Malbon & Charles Lawson eds., 2008) (discussing how trade

agreements involving compulsory licenses must still conform with the TRIPS
requirements).
185.
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993).
186.
See supra Part IV.A (discussing major U.S. trade policy complaints
including the need for a notification requirement in § 1498).
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protection. The pharmaceutical and hi-tech industries are among the
most powerful corporations in developed nations and exert enormous
influence within their respective governments.18 7 These same
corporations argue that if the government had free rein to raid the
patent office whenever it wanted, there would be little reason to
innovate or have a patent system at all. By forcing governments of
other nations to notify the corporation when a patent is used, the
patent owner can likely earn a royalty and monitor the third-party
use to prevent abuse of the privilege.
Consequently, the government's interest in providing notification
and compensation is typically to prevent potential both domestic and
foreign patentees from losing confidence in a patent system and
subsequently refusing to file a patent. 8 8 When inventors, especially
those from foreign countries, refuse to file patents in a nation, the
entire country loses the ability to learn about new technologies it
would normally acquire under a fair patent system.18 9 The countries
listed below have recognized this problem and have written their
statutes to respect patent holders.
1.

The United Kingdom
Use of patented inventions for services of the Crown
(7) Where any use of an invention is made by or with the authority of a
government department under this section, then, unless it appears to
the department that it would be contrary to the public interest to do so,
the department shall notify the proprietor of the patent as soon as
practicable .... 190

The United Kingdom has an extensive statutory section
describing the use of patents for the Crown. The potential reasons
range from national defense and atomic energy programs to any
research matters the Secretary of State considers important.1 9 ' The
192
Crown can also use a patent to fulfill foreign defense contracts.

187.
SELL, supra note 3, at 96 (noting that corporations within the United
States, the European Union, and Japan had enough power to form the Intellectual
Property Committee, which moved the global debate on IP policy toward what
eventually resulted in TRIPS).
188.
Cf. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1373 & n.5 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (Plager, J., dissenting) (discussing how the government's constitutional
obligation to compensate for a taking is based on a longstanding interpretation of
personal freedom and personal integrity), vacated, No. 2009-5135, 2012 WL 833892
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 14, 2012).
189.
See Ren, supra note 44, at 1688-92 (discussing § 1498(a) and the tension
between a patentee's interests and public welfare).
190.
Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 55 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
191.
For a more detailed look at the UK law, see Reese, supra note 14, at 11013.
192.
Ren, supra note 44, at 1666.
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However, the UK statute clearly requires the government to notify a
patent owner of the Crown's use as soon as possible unless contrary to
193
the public interest.
The exception appears on its face to be a loose requirement,
leaving the ultimate interpretation to the Secretary of State. Whether
this situation substantially affects the rights of patent owners in
practice or if the provision is even consistent with TRIPS is open for
debate. However, this language serves as a good example for an
amendment to § 1498. If Congress chooses to amend § 1498
proactively it should resemble the indeterminate language of the UK
law as it allows for a more malleable definition.
2.

China
Where a national emergency or any extraordinary state of affairs
occurs, or public interests so require, the patent administration
department under the State Council may grant a compulsory license for
exploitation of an invention patent or utility model patent.
The decision made by the patent administration department under the
State Council on granting of a compulsory license for exploitation shall
be notified to the patentee in a timely manner and shall be registered
194

and announced.

Recently, China amended its patent law under intense pressure
from the United States and other developed countries. 195 Specifically,
the Chinese government announced amendments to harmonize its IP
laws with the TRIPS requirements. 196 The language indicates that
while the Chinese government can grant compulsory licenses if the
public interest requires, the government must notify a patent owner
while also registering and announcing the use.
Although the statute facially complies with TRIPS, the provision
uses broad language to define the procedures for notification. This is
similar to the UK language as it gives the Chinese government the
flexibility to stretch the definitions of the key terms. 197 Likely, the
Chinese have acquiesced to international pressure but only on a

193.
Id. at 1666-67.
194.
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Main
DedicatedIntellectual Property Laws and Regulations Notified UnderArticle 63.2 of the
Agreement, IP/N/I/CHNP/2 (Dec 21, 2010) (emphasis added) (providing notification of
amendments to intellectual property laws to the WTO after receiving request pursuant
to Article 63). See generally 5 ROBERT H. Hu, CHINESE LAW SERIES 288-90 (2002)
(translating Chinese compulsory license law prior to amendment).
195.
Rachel T. Wu, Comment, Awaking the Sleeping Dragon: The Evolving
Chinese Patent Law and Its Implications for PharmaceuticalsPatents, 34 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 549, 561 (2011).
196.
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 194.
197.
For a discussion of the UK statute, see supra Part V.A. 1.
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superficial level. Interestingly, this type of posturing may serve as a
good template for U.S. legislators looking to amend § 1498 because of
the incredibly indistinct language. Also, if the United States copies
the statutory language of two of the largest members (China and the
United Kingdom), a dispute settlement body is highly unlikely to rule
against the U.S. law.
3.

The European Union
Any provision in the law of a Member State allowing non-commercial
use of national patents by or for the government may be applied to
Community patents, but only to the extent that the use is necessary for
essential defence or national security. The patentee should be informed
be compensated in
as soon as reasonably possible about the act and
19 8
concerned.
government
the
by
act
the
of
respect

The European Union has the unique problem of being a
collection of nations compared to the other countries listed. As such,
the European Union has decided to allow member nations to use
patents for public noncommercial use when a particular nation's
government deems it necessary for national defense. 199 Interestingly
a member nation can use a community patent of the European Union
for its own purposes. 200 This may justify the statutory language
describing notification as only needing to be effectuated "as soon as
reasonably possible."2 0 '
For example, because two nations are in the European Union
does not mean their interests align perfectly. The German
government, deciding to use a patent from an Italian citizen, may
simply abuse the right to government use by delaying notification on
the grounds it could not divulge state secrets. Whether this complies
with EU law is debatable, although it certainly goes a step further
than U.S. law in requiring notification. In all likelihood, any
amendment to § 1498 is more likely to resemble the language
employed by the European Union. It allows for a broad definition and
is less questionable to the WTO.
4.

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

Oddly the United States has entered into another agreement
besides TRIPS that requires notification to a patent owner.
Where the law of a Party allows for use of the subject matter of patent,
other than that use allowed under paragraph 6, without the

Proposalfor a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, Annex, art. 9a,
198.
No. 15149/09 (Oct. 30, 2009) (emphasis added).
199.
Id.
Id.
200.
Id.
201.
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authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or
other persons authorized by the government, the Party shall respect
the following provisions:
(b) ... In the case of public non-commercial use, where the government
or contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has
demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by
or for the government, the right holder shall be informed
promptly .... 202

NAFTA requires the U.S. government to notify patent owners
when it uses a patent without permission. 20 3 Executive Order 12889
obligates agencies within the U.S. government to implement the
agreement. 20 4 Clearly, the President recognized the need for agencies
to notify patent owners under certain conditions contrary to § 1498.
In practice, this would likely mean an agency having reason to
believe a patent is being used, where the owner falls within the
20 5
province of NAFTA, is required to notify a patent owner promptly.
However, there is no evidence found by this Author that any patent
owner has been notified in compliance with NAFTA.
Considering NAFTA and the laws in other developed nations
highlighted above, it seems unlikely that other nations would not be
upset over the U.S. position on notification. To that end, many of the
would-be plaintiffs will likely use these examples to build an
argument of bad faith by the U.S. government. Entering into an
agreement with other countries and never fulfilling the requirements
will shift the presumption of innocence away from the United States
to the advantage of a WTO member. Thus, the United States needs to
protect its interests by enacting provisions similar to those stated
above in the near future.
B. PredisputeInitiation: Comply with TRIPS by Amending § 1498
In previous years there have been proposals in Congress to
amend § 1498.206 These centered on granting the government
authority to use patents for public health emergencies in the
compulsory licensing context. Although these proposals do not truly
deal with much of the secret nature of government contracting work,
notification would be required. 20 7 It is unclear how that procedure

202.
North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 185, art. 1709
(emphasis added).
203.
Id.
204.
Exec. Order No. 12,889, 3 C.F.R. 708 (1994), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 3311
(2006).
Id. § 6.
205.
206.
Ren, supra note 44, at 1693-96 (describing the implementation of a
reimbursement procedure that implicitly requires notification).
207.
Id.
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would work in practice, but it is assumed in the proposals that the
patent owner would be notified at some point in the future. However,
none of these proposed amendments to § 1498 have been passed or
208
seriously considered.
Instead of focusing solely on the public health context, the
United States should amend the law to deal with all areas of
government contracting. Two existing statutes in the United States
can serve as a model when amending § 1498. Section 153 of the
Atomic Energy Act allows the Department of Energy to use an
inventor's privately held patent so long as the infringing agency
provide the patent owner with the opportunity for a hearing. 20 9 This
assumes that notification has been effected since the applicant must
attempt to obtain a license from the patent owner on reasonable
terms. Section 308 of the Federal Clean Air Act permits the
2 10
If
government to take private patents for public or commercial use.
the requirements of the Act are satisfied, the presiding court must
ensure the patent holder receive procedural due process, which
2 11
assumes notification.
Although both of these statutes have rarely, if ever, been used,
they serve as examples for Congress. 2 12 Without question any country
bringing a dispute against the United States will use these two
statutes to show the U.S. government purposefully chose to ignore the
TRIPS requirement for notifying the patent owner of government use.
The U.S. government should take notice of its conflicting policies and
use these as possible templates for change.
There are some additional proposals in the academic community
on how to amend § 1498.213 These typically envision a total
restructuring of the statute to prevent other possible TRIPS
violations. 214 However, this would be overly ambitious and
misguided. The United States has viewed its patent law as the
subject of national and not international concern since its creation.
Rarely has the United States changed any laws based on
international pressures.

208.
Id.
209.
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 153, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2006)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2183(b)(1) (granting the United States
government the authority to use an inventor's privately held patent to perform its
powers under the Atomic Energy Act).
210.
Clean Air Act, § 308, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7608 (2006)); see ITSSD COMMENTS, supra note 15, at 27-28 (describing the federal
government's compulsory licensing powers under the Clean Air Act).
211.
ITSSD COMMENTS, supra note 15, at 28.
212.
Id. at 27.
213.
E.g., Reese, supra note 14, at 116 (attempting to reconcile a loophole that
relieves the government of its duty to pay the patent holder if the infringement takes
place outside the United States while only casually addressing the notification issue).
214.
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Instead, this Note articulates a modest proposal to § 1498 that
allows for notification of the patent owner when the government has
used a patent without permission, subject only to legitimate national
security concerns. Although not defined, TRIPS demands only that
the patent owner be informed promptly. Balancing the need for the
United States to use patents discreetly with the interests of patent
holders (especially foreign), the following is a proposal for
consideration:
A BILL
To amend chapter 14 of title 28, United States Code, to provide for
notification of patent use by the government.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
Section 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Notification of Government Patent Use
Act of 2012"
Section 2. GOVERNMENT USE OF PRIVATE PARTIES' PATENTS
Section 1498 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end of subsection (a) the following:
(1)

When the Government, or authorized agent, knows or has
demonstrable grounds to know a valid patent is or will be used
by or for the government within the scope of § 1498, the right
holder shall be informed promptly, subject only to national
security.

The key to this amendment is that the United States, like China
and the European Union, can define "promptly" as it wishes. If the
United States amends § 1498 to appear similar to the interpretation
of other members, the DSU will be hard-pressed to rule against the
United States even if implemented contrary to the TRIPS
215
principles.
Admittedly the costs of notifying the patent holder under such a
statute are difficult to calculate. Because many of the public
noncommercial uses are done by defense contractors looking to escape
research costs, the actual amount is speculative at best. While there
certainly will be a cost, there is also a benefit. Patent owners,
especially the increasing number of foreign patent owners, will know
that the burden is not on them to discover government use of their
patent. Although reasonable compensation may drastically undercut
the true value of a patent, every patent holder will choose the ability
to learn of the use over nothing. Because TRIPS allows for
government use of patents without permission,2 16 patent owners have

215.
See supra Parts III.A, IV.C (describing the DSU's unwillingness to rule
against the United States).
216.
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31 (requiring only that the government
inform the patent owner).
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a vested interest in gaining at least some revenue while preventing
third parties from abusing the law.
C. PostdisputeInitiation:Arguments to Distinguishthe Law
If the United States fails to act before another country brings a
dispute, the best course of action is to argue over the definition of
"promptly" as used in Article 31 of TRIPS. Without a defined
timetable for notifying patent holders, the United States should argue
it can notify patent holders when the government deems reasonable.
This assumes that lack of a statutory requirement for notification is
different from a prohibition on the practice. Under statutory
interpretation, the lack of a requirement is different from a rule in
place against one. In addition, the United States should argue the
WTO must show deference on this matter because of the lack of such
a standard. 2 17 Without guidance from TRIPS, the lack of statutory
language in § 1498 does not preclude the United States from notifying
a patent holder of use when it is appropriate.
Although success seems unlikely, the United States could also
attempt to invoke Article 73. Arguing the reasonable interpretation of
Article 73 requires a flexible standard and § 1498 is necessary to
fulfill a vital national security purpose would be the United States'
last viable claim of validity. The argument would say that Article 73
was meant to ensure that while TRIPS is an international measure of
compliance, power still resides with the individual nations to
determine their national security interests. Additionally, because the
United States has valued the secrecy of its national security, Article
73 allows the member to interpret certain provisions of TRIPS,
including Article 31, in light of that concern. As such, § 1498 opens
the government up to liability for reasonable compensation when use
of a patent is discovered.
However, in choosing to not require the government to notify
patent owners of use in statutory form, the United States has left
itself flexibility to determine case-by-case how the interests of the
patent owner balance against those of the nation at large. For the
reasons stated earlier about the viability of the Article 73 defense,
this argument will likely fail and leave the United States
2 18
defenseless.

217.
To see this strategy employed in a WTO dispute, see Arbitration Award,
Canada-PatentProtection of PharmaceuticalProducts, WT/DS114/13 (Aug. 18, 2000)
(ruling on the flexibility of terms in Article 27 of TRIPS that, like those found in Article
31, are not adequately defined for a uniform construction in all countries).
218.
However there are a variety of similar arguments under the various WTO
Agreements. E.g., Comm. on Gov't Procurement, Revision of the Agreement on
Government Procurement, art. XXIII GPA/W/297 (Dec. 11, 2006) ("Nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party from taking any action or not
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VI. CONCLUSION

Nations around the world would like nothing more than for
certain U.S. policies to simply vanish. However, instead of first
attacking the United States on the biggest issues, rival nations will
likely find a dispute that is small on its face but still has real teeth.
The United States' lack of notification is exactly the type of dispute a
member can bring with a high probability of success. Ideally, the
United States would amend § 1498 to correct the problem itself. But if
not, the rest of the world will likely use such a violation to their
advantage.
The United States has angered nations around the world with its
use of trade policies deemed contrary to TRIPS by many members.
From § 301 powers to forcing TRIPS-plus measures on countries, both
developing and developed nations have a vested interest in forcing
the United States into complying with TRIPS. For its own protection,
the United States must immediately plug this leak in the law before
rival nations put U.S. trade policies on the chopping block.
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